Anselm of Canterbury and the Ontological Argument

In the early 1060s, a young theologian began making waves in France for his erudition. Anselm, born in Northern Italy in 1033, had travelled to the Benedictine school in the town of Bec in the 1050s, where he would study under the renowned Lanfranc. It rapidly became evident that Anselm was Lanfranc’s equal, and that he was endowed with a powerful intellect. When Lanfranc was called to Canterbury to become Archbishop, Anselm, around 1063, was invited to replace Lanfranc as head teacher at the school of Bec. While Anselm was teaching in the school at Bec, he wrote his well-known Monologion (c. 1075-76). In the prefaces of both the Monologion and the Proslogion, Anselm explains that he had first written the Monologion, at the request of the members of the community at Bec, in order to show how a person seeking to understand the truth could reflect clearly on the Christian faith. 1

The Ideal Argument for God?

Having composed a treatise containing a number of traditional arguments demonstrating that God is, and something of the divine nature, Anselm explains, in the preface to the Proslogion, written some 2-3 years later, that he now “began to wonder if perhaps it might be possible to find one single argument that for its proof required no other save itself, and that by itself would suffice to prove that God really exists, that He is the supreme good needing no other and is He whom all things have need of for their being and well-being, and also to prove whatever we believe about the Divine Being.” 2 He goes on to explain that through great difficulty and intellectual travail, he finally stumbled upon what appeared to be that one single argument—what came to be known as the Ontological argument. In what follows, we will outline Anselm’s argument, noting what distinguishes it from other theistic proofs, discuss its reception, and note something of its influence in the history of Western thought.

The Ontological Argument, which is often understood as an attempt to demonstrate that God exists, and that God exists necessarily, is also directly related to a method of arriving at knowledge of the divine nature called “Perfect Being Theology”. We will make some comments on this near the conclusion of this article. The ontological argument is debated for many reasons, including not only whether or not it is a valid and conclusive argument, but even as to whether it is, in fact, an argument. There are two main sides in this secondary debate: (i) it was written by Anselm to be a demonstrative argument, or (ii) it was written to be a devotional reflection. Some scholars, considering the overall form of the Proslogion (written as a prayer to God asking for understanding of the God in which he believes), as well as its intended audience (monks in the monastery), have concluded that it is not intended to be a rigorous deductive argument intending to demonstrate that God exists. In favour of the contrary opinion, we find the stated purpose of the Proslogion, quoted above, and the fact that when he presents what has become known as the Ontological Argument, he begins with a notion of God that he thinks even the Atheist might agree with. 3

Anselm’s Reasoning

Turning to the actual articulation of the Ontological Argument, some, such as Richard Taylor, have suggested that we find not one, but two distinct ontological arguments, demonstrating (1) that God is, and (2) that God is, necessarily. 4 Others, such as Marenbon, think that there is only one argument (the first). 5 All other arguments in the Proslogion would then be building upon the conclusion of the Ontological Argument—describing how God is. Consider the main argument which is understood to be the Ontological argument:

1. “You are something than which nothing greater can be thought.” 6

2. To exist in reality (to be a Real Being) and to exist as an idea or concept in the mind (to be a Being of Reason) is greater than to be only an idea or concept in the mind.

3. But, suggests Anselm, it is possible to conceive of a being “than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought” (even the atheist recognizes that they can conceive of such a Being), and it is possible to conceive of such a Being as existing both in the mind and in reality.

4. But, if “God” (as defined in 1) exists in the intellect alone, then we run into a contradiction, because we can conceive of such a Being which exists in both the intellect and in reality. “If then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists in the mind alone, this same that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is that-than- which-a-greater-can-be-thought.” 7

5. Therefore, “there is absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists both in the mind and in reality.” 8

Concerning the first premise, Anselm appears to suggest that all men—even the Atheist—when they use the term “God” have this idea in mind. That is, the Atheist is not simply denying the existence of the Greek, Roman, or Nordic pantheon, but allowing for the existence of a single supreme deity; rather, the Atheist denies the existence of “God” (all claims to divinity), period. Furthermore, if the atheist doesn’t know what he means when he denies the existence of God, then he is ignorant, and no atheist. This, however, entails that the Atheist has a conception of God as the most supreme being, and denies that such a being exists. “Or can it be that a thing of such a nature does not exist, since ‘the Fool has said in his heart, there is no God’ [Ps. 13: 1; 52: 1]? But surely, when this same Fool hears what I am speaking about, namely, ‘something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought’, he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind, even if he does not understand that it actually exists. For it is one thing for an object to exist in the mind, and another thing to understand that an object actually exists.” 9 Anselm suggests that this entails that this definition is accepted by atheists and theists alike. The first premise is not a novel description of God, but can be found in the writings of a variety of patristic and medieval Christian theologians. Our articulation of the first premise also points us towards an important distinction which is presented in the second premise.

The second premise appeals to the important distinction between “Real Being” (substance) and “Being of Reason”. To help us understand this distinction, Anselm gives the example of a painting. The idea of a painting clearly exists, in some way, in the mind of the artist prior to its existence on the canvas. But, even a mediocre copy of an original painting, hanging on a wall, is greater, or more valuable, than the unpainted idea of the painting in the mind of the artist. Another example might be the comparison between “the idea of a million dollars” versus “a single dollar in your bank account.” The single dollar is of more value than the idea of a million dollars. The distinction between real being and beings of reason is also not a novel distinction, and can be traced back to Plato through a variety of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian theologians. The third and fourth premises appear to draw out the consequences of the first two premises, entailing that God, so defined, is.

Medieval Hesitations

Anselm’s argument has become one of the most well-known and debated theistic arguments. Share on X Anselm’s argument has become one of the most well-known and debated theistic arguments. Some of its most important critics have been Christian theologians and philosophers. In his own time, a fellow monk named Gaunilo wrote to Anselm to critique the argument of the Proslogion. He criticized Anselm’s argument by suggesting that thinking of something as being the most excellent of this type of thing does not imply that this thing must actually exist. Gaunilo gives the counter-example of an island which is the most excellent island that one could think of. Using the same type of reasoning, Gaunilo seeks to arrive at the same conclusion as Anselm concerning the island. He concludes by saying, “If, I say, he tries to show me, in this way, that the island exists for real, and that I should no longer doubt its existence, either I would suspect that he was joking or I would begin wondering whom should be said to be more crazy: me, if I grant him his conclusion, or him, if he thinks he can demonstrate that such an island exists with certainty.”10

Gaunilo, and many philosophers since his time, found it hard to believe that by the very fact of defining the essence of a thing as existing, one could demonstrate that it exists. As Taylor says, “One cannot raise them [imaginary beings, the greatest island that we can imagine, etc.] into existence merely by conceiving of them as surpassingly beautiful, or even as perfect; nor is this accomplished by inconspicuously slipping the idea of existence into one’s original notion of perfection.” 11 In other words, it is not because we say that a concept includes the notion of existence that this concept therefore exists.

In a similar way, Thomas Aquinas also critiqued Anselm’s argument in the Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 1, where he says,

To the second [adverse or contrary opinion], we say that it is not certain that he who hears this name, ‘God’, understands it as signifying something than which a greater cannot be thought, since some have believed that God is a body. But let us assume that all understand that the name of God signifies what we have said, that is, something than which a greater cannot be thought; It follows, not that everyone understands that this name refers to something that is in nature (reality), but that it is in intellectual apprehension. It is not possible to demonstrate that such a being is, unless there really is something than which a greater cannot be thought, which is not given by those who propose that God does not exist.12

In other words, unless we have already demonstrated that God exists, we are not permitted to conclude that God exists simply by conceiving of God in our intellect. We cannot move from mind (being of reason) to reality (real being).

Another problem which is raised by Aquinas is that not all men, when they hear or use the term “God”, understand a being than which a greater cannot be thought. Some use the term “God” to refer to powerful forces beyond their comprehension; others talk of powerful but finite deities; other worship creation and/or creatures as divine. As such, the first premise, whether or not it is a true description of God per se, is not a universally accepted description of God. It is not true that all men understand God as that than which no greater can be thought. As such, the first premise is not self-evidently true to us, and, therefore, must be demonstrated.

Impactful in its Mystery

From the time of its publication to the present day, many of history’s greatest scholars have interacted with Anselm’s argument, seeking to defend or refute it. The counter-arguments against the Ontological argument are powerful. However, whether or not the argument succeeds, there is still something about the Ontological argument that is profoundly perplexing. This has been noticed by a number of philosophers. John Marenbon points to this conundrum when he notes that,

Critics have protested, either that existence is not a property at all (or, in Kant’s version, ‘existence is not a predicate’), or that, even if it is a property, it is not a great-making property…But Anselm is making a contrast between different types of existence—existence in the intellect alone, existence in reality. It seems entirely reasonable to take an entity which certainly exists in some way—for example, as a character in fiction or as a concept in my mind—and to consider whether it has the additional property of existing in reality. And there is an obvious, intuitive way in which real existence is great-making—or is Walter Mitty, with his billions of imaginary dollars, genuinely as well-off as Bill Gates, with his billions of real ones?13

This type of question is what may be part of the continuing interest and controversy surrounding Anselm’s ingenious argument. Indeed, the history of the ontological argument after Anselm is quite interesting. 14 A quick history of interaction with this argument would need to include, besides those already mentioned, St. Bonaventure (In Des Mysterio Trinitatis, 1,1, 10-20, where he gives it a slightly more psychological emphasis), John Dun Scotus, and, René Descartes (1596-1650), who proposed his own version of the ontological argument. It is entirely possible that when he first composed his version of this argument, he had not read Anselm. Many of his contemporaries responded to Descartes, during his own lifetime, including the priest Caterus, and Father Gassendi.

Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) proposed his own version of the argument. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) accepted the validity of Descartes’ version, but sought to improve upon it. After Leibniz, we find Kant’s powerful arguments against the Cartesian version of the Ontological argument. Others to interact helpfully with some version of the Ontological Argument include Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), G. E. Moore (1873- 1958), William P. Alston (1921-2009), J. N. Findlay (1903-1987, who published an ontological argument designed to demonstrate that God does not exist), Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000), Norman Malcolm (1911-1990), and, recently, Alvin Plantinga (1932-present).

Some, such as Marenbon have suggested that “the strongest forms of the ontological argument are the variations of the argument invented by Alvin Plantinga.” 15 Plantinga’s argument can be found in chapter 10 of his important book, The Nature of Necessity. Needless to say, the discussion is ongoing. In a supremely ingenious manner, Anselm, an 11th century monk, sparked one of the most interesting discussions concerning the being and nature of God, and how man knows that and what God is.”In a supremely ingenious manner, Anselm, an 11th century monk, sparked one of the most interesting discussions concerning the being and nature of God, and how man knows that and what God is. Share on X

We conclude with a comment about how Anselm’s Ontological Argument became a means of not only demonstrating that God is, but what God is. In chapter 5 of the Proslogion, Anselm draws out one of the apparent consequences of premise 1 of the Ontological argument: If God is “something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought”, then God is clearly the greatest of all beings—the most “supreme being.” God must, therefore, be “whatever it is better to be than not to be.” 16 The idea, here, is that if God would be more supreme if he was [some predicate] than if he wasn’t [that same predicate], then, as God is by definition the most supreme being, then he must supremely be [that predicate]. To be [that predicate] would be greater than not to be [that predicate]. Therefore, God is [that predicate]. 17 Using this same argument by which Anselm demonstrates God, he goes on to demonstrate that God is supremely knowing, powerful, merciful, impassible, good, true, just, alive, immortal, eternal, infinite, and so on. As with the Ontological Argument itself, this process of articulating the divine nature has been alternately defended and criticized. In a supremely ingenious manner, Anselm, an 11th century monk, sparked one of the most interesting discussions concerning the being and nature of God, and how man knows that and what God is.

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Endnotes

1 Anselm, Proslogion, trans. M. J. Charlesworth, in Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, ed. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (1998; repr., Oxford: OUP, 2008), 82. Anselm, Monologion, trans. Simon Harrison, in Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works, ed. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (1998; repr., Oxford: OUP, 2008), 3-4, 5.

2 Anselm, Proslogion, 82.

3 Anselm, Proslogion, 87.4 Richard Taylor, “Introduction”, dans The Ontological Argument from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers, ed. Alvin Plantinga (Garden City, NY: Anchor books, 1965), ix.

5 John Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction (New York/London: Routledge, 2007), 127.

6 Anselm, Proslogion, 87.

7 Anselm, Proslogion, 87-8.

8 Anselm, Proslogion, 88.

9 Anselm, Proslogion, 87.10 Gaunilon, Liber Pro Insipiente Adversus S. Anselmi In Proslogio Ratiocinationem, dans Opuscula Philosophico-Theologica: Selecta, edited by Carolus Haas (Tubingae: Bibliopolio Lauppiano, 1863), 134. Our translation. In Latin we read, “Si, inquam, per haec ille mihi velit astruere de insula illa, quod vere sit, et ambigendum ultra non esse: aut jocari ipsum credam, aut nescio quem stultiorem debeam reputare; utrum me, si ei concedam; an illum, si se putet aliqua certitudine insulae illius essentiam astruxisse, nisi prius ipsam praestantiam ejus solummodo sicut rem vere atque indubie existentem.”

11 Taylor, “Introduction,” xii.

12 Thomas d’Aquin, Somme Théologiae I, Q. 2, A. 1, ad 2. Traduction le mien. En Latin on lit, « Ad secundum dicendum quod forte ille qui audit hoc nomen Deus, non intelligit significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine Deus significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo maius cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura; sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest, quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse. »

13 Marenbon, MP, 126.

14 Cf. Alvin Plantinga, ed., The Ontological Argument from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers (Anchor Books, 1965). Graham Oppy, ed., Ontological Arguments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

15 Marenbon, MP, 127.

16 Anselm, Proslogion, 89.

17 Cf. Brian Leftow, God and Necessity (Oxford: OUP, 2012). Jeff Speaks, “The Method of Perfect Being Theology”, Faith and Philosophy, vol. 31, no. 3 (July 2014): 256-66.

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